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Normal Investors, Then and Now
Meir Statman
Investors were never "rational" as defined by standard finance. They were "normal" in 1945, and they remain normal today.
The 1960 volume of the Financial Analysts Journal contains a pair of remarkable articles. In the first, "The Case for an Unmanaged Investment Company," Edward Renshaw and Paul Feldstein compared the returns of mutual funds to those of the DJIA and found that only 11 of 89 diversified common stock and balanced funds had returns higher than those of the DJIA. This and similar evidence led them to propose the creation of what we know today as an index fund: a new investment institution, what we have chosen to call an "unmanaged investment company"-in other words, a company dedicated to the task of following a representative average. (p. 43) In the second article, "The Case for Mutual Fund Management," John B. Armstrong argued against the idea of an index fund, "[f]irst and foremost," because it ignores the fact . . . that the Dow Jones Industrial Average has not in fact matched common stock mutual funds with comparable volatility in performance results. (p. 37) "John B. Armstrong" was the pen name of a man who had spent many years in the securities field and in the study and analysis of mutual funds. He was a graduate of Princeton University, and the title of his AB thesis was "Economic Role of the Investment Company." The real "John B. Armstrong" is John C. Bogle, the founder of The Vanguard Group, who introduced the first of many index mutual funds in 1976 and remains their foremost advocate.
Bogle reflected on index funds and changed his mind. 1 This 60th anniversary of the FAJ is an opportunity for all of us to reflect on past changes of mind and perhaps contemplate future ones.
The year 1960 was the middle of an extraordinary time when academics and practitioners of finance were changing their minds, switching from a framework in which investors are "normal" to one in which investors are "rational." Normal investors are affected by cognitive biases and emotions; rational investors are not. Rational investors care only about the risk and expected return of their overall portfolios; normal investors care about more than that.
The portrait of investors as rational is the first foundation block of standard finance. Other foundation blocks are mean-variance portfolio theory, the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), and market efficiency. I describe normal investors as they were portrayed in the FAJ and other finance journals before standard finance was introduced and as they have emerged recently in behavioral finance. If the value of a company that pays generous dividends is higher than the value of an otherwise identical company that pays no dividends, rational investors will engage in arbitrage-selling shares of the first and buying shares of the second-until the values of the two companies converge. Indeed, arbitrage will do its work even if most investors are normal-that is, are affected by form, label, or packaging-as long as there are some rational investors who engage in arbitrage.
Rational Investors
Recognition of the power of arbitrage led Miller to argue not only that security prices are affected only by the "real considerations" of the earning power of the company's assets and its investment policy but also that exploration of considerations other than "real considerations" is a harmful distraction. As Miller wrote in 1986 , in response to the behavioral approach to the dividend question proposed by Hersh Shefrin and me (1984) :
Behind each holding may be a story of family business, family quarrels, legacies received, divorce settlements, and a host of other considerations. . . . That we abstract from all these stories in building our models is not because the stories are uninteresting but because they may be too interesting and thereby distract us from pervasive market forces that should be our principal concern. (p. S467)
The preference of rational investors for more rather than less and the power of arbitrage also underlie the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), the second foundation block of standard finance. An efficient market is a market where prices are always equal to fundamental values. As Eugene Fama (1965) said in the FAJ, "in an efficient market at any point in time the actual price of a security will be a good estimate of its intrinsic value" (p. 56). Any deviation of price from value invites rational investors to engage in arbitrage, sometimes risk free and sometimes risky, and their trades drive price toward value.
The labels of "weak," "semistrong," and "strong" for the forms of the EMH would come only later, but Alfred Cowles noted in 1960 that the power of arbitrage would make markets efficient in the weak form, where prices follow a random walk. Citing Tjalling C. Koopmans, Cowles wrote that if the persistence in stock price movements were sufficient to provide capital gains appreciably in excess of brokerage costs, professional traders would presumably be aware of this situation and through their market operations would inadvertently wipe out the persistence in price movements from which they were attempting to profit. (p. 915)
Cowles published his first article on random walk in 1933; in 1998, Stephen Brown, William Goetzmann, and Alok Kumar argued that Cowles' article "is a watershed study that led to the random walk hypothesis and thus played a key role in the development of the efficient market theory" (p. 1330). But the real push for the random walk hypothesis had to wait until Harry Roberts' 1959 article and, especially, Fama's 1965 and other articles. Neither Roberts nor Fama cited Cowles' 1933 article.
Roberts wrote that many financial analysts "believe that the history of the market itself contains 'patterns' that give clues to the future, if only these patterns can be properly understood" (p. 1). He went on to examine the patterns of stock prices and found that they are no more than "statistical artifacts" that would arise by chance.
Fama titled his FAJ article "Random Walks in Stock Market Prices." Because stock prices move in a random walk, he wrote, "[a] simple policy of buying and holding a security will be as good as any more complicated mechanical procedure for timing purchases and sales" (p. 56).
The weak form of the EMH states that all past market prices are fully reflected in current securities prices; therefore, investors cannot gain abnormal returns through technical analysis-that is, by uncovering patterns in stock prices. The semistrong form states that all publicly available information is fully reflected in current securities prices; therefore, investors can gain abnormal returns neither through technical analysis nor through fundamental analysis-by which they uncover insights in public information. Tests of the semistrong hypothesis often require adjustment for differences in risk among stocks, and such tests did not come to full function until the mid-1960s when William Sharpe introduced the CAPM, in which beta measures the only risk that affects expected returns (see Sharpe 1964) . The CAPM, in turn, had to await Harry Markowitz's development of mean-variance portfolio theory in the 1950s (see Markowitz 1999 Markowitz's mean-variance portfolio theory is prescriptive, recommending the mean-variance algorithm to investors who care only about the risk and expected return of their portfolios, but the CAPM is descriptive, describing investors who build mean-variance portfolios.
Finally, in 1968, Michael Jensen introduced "Jensen's alpha," based on the CAPM, and offered evidence supporting the semistrong EMH. He found that the risk-adjusted returns of mutual funds were lower, on average, than the return of the stock market as a whole. The foundation blocks of standard finance were now in place, supporting one another. Investors are to be considered rational, prices are efficient, risk is measured by beta, and investors form portfolios by the rules of meanvariance portfolio theory.
Normal Investors
Investors were normal before Miller and Modigliani described them as rational, and they remain normal today. In an FAJ article in 1957, before the introduction of standard finance, Howard Snyder tried to teach normal investors "how to take a loss and like it." Explaining that realizing losses increases wealth by reducing taxes, he wrote, "There is no loss without collateral compensation." He went on to note, however, that normal investors are reluctant to realize losses:
Human nature being what it is, we are loath to take a loss until we are forced into it. Too often we believe that by ignoring a loss we will some day glance at the asset to find it has not only recovered its original value but has shown some appreciation. (p. 116)
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Investors who exhibit the normal "human nature" behavior described by Snyder would have been branded irrational by Miller and Modigliani. Snyder's normal investors deviate from rational behavior in two ways. First, they do not always prefer more wealth to less, as rational investors do, because they forgo the increment to their wealth brought by tax savings. Second, unlike rational investors, they are not indifferent to whether a loss is labeled a paper loss or a realized loss.
Snyder's 1957 observation about the reluctance of normal investors to realize losses was reintroduced by Shefrin and me as the "disposition effect" in 1985, during the early period of behavioral finance. Shefrin and I analyzed the disposition of investors to sell winners too early and ride losers too long; our framework was a behavioral framework in which investors-normal investors-are affected by cognitive biases and emotions. A cognitive bias leads normal investors to consider their stocks one by one, in mental accounts distinct from their overall portfolios, and to distinguish paper losses from realized losses. Normal investors are reluctant to realize losses because realization closes mental accounts at a loss, thereby extinguishing all hope of recovery and inflicting the emotional pain of regret.
Investor attitudes toward dividends were the direct target of Miller and Modigliani in their 1961 article, which labeled as irrational any preference for dividends or for capital gains. One of the objects of their criticism was John Clendenin, who explored the preference for dividends and capital gains in a 1958 article. Clendenin wrote:
Back in 1951, with the uncertainties of depression and war still uppermost in their minds, stockholders expressed strong preferences for conservative stocks, cash dividends, and safety above all. In 1958, after seven years of prosperity and stock-market boom, a majority of the answers indicate a willingness to own speculative as well as conservative stocks, a less positive emphasis on cash dividends, and an interest in market profits which is almost as great as that in income and safety. (p 48) Attitudes toward dividends and capital gains continue to change as generations of investors come and go. Shefrin and I (1984) wrote that in 1974, some Consolidated Edison shareholders considered dividend checks the equivalent of Social Security checks and were extremely distressed when the company eliminated its dividend. We quoted from the transcript of Con Edison's shareholders' meeting of that year:
A lady came over to me a minute ago and she said to me, "Please say a word for the senior citizens." And she had a tear in her eyes. And I really know what she means by that. She simply means that now she will only get one check a month, and that will be her Social Security, and she's not going to make it, because you have denied her that dividend. (p. 277)
The generation that followed the senior citizen investors in Con Edison did not care much about dividends, and by the peak of the 1990s boom, dividend yields were approaching zero. But the bust of the early 2000s might renew interest in dividends in the generation that follows.
The EMH was new and threatening in 1965, when Fama introduced it to the readers of the FAJ. In the efficient stock market world Fama described, there are no overpriced securities or underpriced ones. But analysts and investors believed there were. In 1957, Robert Tucker wrote in the FAJ: Security Analysts owe their very existence to the concept that value and price do not coincide. "Overpriced" and "underpriced" are adjectives repeatedly used in an analytical description of a security. (p. 93) Security analysts continue to challenge the EMH in their daily work. Block (1999) reported in the FAJ that only 2.7 percent of security analysts agree strongly with the semistrong form of the EMH. Similarly, investors challenge the EMH in their daily investment behavior. Investors continue to allocate almost all their mutual fund money to active mutual funds that try to beat the market rather than to index funds that try to match it.
Academics took longer to challenge the EMH, but even some academics protested the increasing acceptance of the EMH in the early 1960s. Robert Weintraub (1963) wrote:
In the past few years a number of academic papers have concluded that speculative price movements are random walks. . . . I shall argue that the random-walk hypothesis flies in the face of common sense and the facts and, moreover, suggests a degree of naïveté on the part of its advocates as to the rules of the game which professional speculators are playing. . . . It is a fact that there are professional traders who earn incomes from speculating on price movements. . . . These men, in effect, earn their incomes by betting against the applicability of the random-walk hypothesis. (pp. 59-61) In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a series of return anomalies, such as those associated with size and book value to market value, were uncovered that gave academics additional pause. The anomalies might indicate that markets are inefficient. Alternatively, they might indicate that the CAPM is a bad asset-pricing model. In 1992, Fama and Kenneth French concluded that anomalies are reflections of a bad asset-pricing model rather than an inefficient market and created the three-factor model, in which size and book-to-market are factors rather than anomalies. The number of factors in asset-pricing models keeps growing; now, momentum and liquidity are often included. Perhaps, it's time for an asset-pricing model to include factors that reflect other preferences of normal investors.
Much of the distinction between rationality and normality in the investment context is a distinction between utilitarian and expressive characteristics. Expressive characteristics are those that enable normal people to identify their values, social class, and life style and to communicate them to others. For example, a Timex watch and a Rolex watch have identical utilitarian characteristics: They show the same hour. But they have different expressive characteristics. A Timex conveys reliability and thrift; a Rolex conveys riches and ostentation. As I have described in the FAJ (Statman 1999) , value stocks can be considered the equivalent of Timex watches and growth stocks, the equivalent of Rolex watches.
Behavioral asset-pricing theory (Shefrin and Statman 1994) offers a model that recognizes that the cognitive biases of investors cause the meanvariance-efficient portfolio to deviate from the market portfolio and cause the resulting behavioral betas, calculated relative to the mean-varianceefficient portfolio, to deviate from market betas. Recently, Fama and French (2004) presented similar ideas. Investors are interested in more than money payoffs, they stated; investors also want the pleasure of holding growth stocks or the virtue of holding socially responsible stocks, and their tastes may affect stock prices. So, expressive characteristics, such as those associated with growth or social responsibility, have a place in asset-pricing models. Fama and French's 2004 article shows how great the change of mind has been since 1986, when Miller urged academics to stay away from "family business, family quarrels, legacies received, divorce settlements, and a host of other considerations," which he called distracting. We are moving toward asset-pricing models that combine utilitarian and expressive characteristics and toward a better understanding of market efficiency.
Markowitz wrote in his 1999 FAJ review that, although the benefits of diversification were known before he introduced mean-variance portfolio theory, no theory along the lines of meanvariance portfolio theory existed before Markowitz. But portfolio theory along the lines of behavioral portfolio theory (Shefrin and Statman 2000) did exist. In behavioral portfolio theory, investors build their portfolios as layered pyramids in which different assets, corresponding to different goals and different attitudes toward risk, fill the different layers. This concept of a layered portfolio goes back many years. In 1952, Weisenberger listed the layers of portfolios from bottom to top as income, balanced, growth, and aggressive growth. Bonds were the right securities for the income layer; stocks with generous dividends, such as utility stocks, were right for the balanced layer; stocks that paid modest dividends were right for the growth layer; and stocks that paid no dividends were right for the aggressive growth layer.
In a similar approach, a 1929 article in the Literary Digest stated:
The first step in a safe and sane financial program is insurance. . . . After insurance, the next requirement is to build up a cash reserve of at least $1,000 in the savings bank. After that, automatic thrift should be contracted for through installment savings plans, such as building-and-loan associations offer. When these fundamental steps have been taken, the investor is in position to acquire high-grade bonds and guaranteed first mortgages on realestate. The next advance can be toward diversified preferred stocks, which offer a somewhat higher return. . . . The last step should be outright purchase of the best grade of diversified common stock. ("No Royal Road. . ." 1929, p. 55) Some investors continue to pretend that they use mean-variance portfolio theory, perhaps because they want to present themselves as rational investors. Such investors feed into the meanvariance optimizer expected returns, standard deviations, and correlations, and the optimizer spits out asset allocations on the mean-variance-efficient frontier. But the optimizer is no more than a prop. The important asset allocation choices are made through constraints-such as "no more than 10 ©2005, CFA Institute percent allocation to alternative investments." In short, the true (but unspoken) framework for normal investors' portfolios is behavioral portfolio theory.
Conclusion
Investors were normal before they were described as rational in the early 1960s, and they remain normal today. Normal investors are affected by cognitive biases and emotions, whereas rational investors are not. Rational investors care only about the risk and expected return of their overall portfolios, whereas normal investors care about more.
Wilford Eiteman sought to educate normal investors about dividend yield in a 1957 FAJ article: "The danger of current yield data lies in a tendency of uninformed investors to accept current yields as indicating the rate of return which they may expect" (p. 13). Harry Comer sought to educate normal investors about stock splits in a 1958 FAJ article:
Recently a client asked if Bethlehem Steel did not look cheap "at 40." On being reminded that Bethlehem stock had been split 12-for-1 since the war, and that a price of $40 now is equivalent to $480 per share for the stock which was priced around $75 at the end of the war, he said he had forgotten about the splits. (p. 79)
More recently, some FAJ authors have been seeking to teach normal investors that • stock prices move in patterns, not in a random walk (Zhou and Dong (2004) ,
• sentiment associated with St. Patrick's Day and the Jewish High Holy Days affects stock prices (Frieder and Subrahmanyam 2004 ), • even professional traders are reluctant to realize losses (Garvey and Murphy 2004) , and • investors form portfolios by the rules of behavioral portfolio theory rather than those of meanvariance portfolio theory (Statman (2004) . Many years ago, in an early session of my economics studies, a professor asked if speculators stabilize prices or destabilize them. "Speculators are greedy profiteers," said one student. "Speculators jump on price bandwagons and destabilize prices," said a second student. Then came my turn. I said that speculators always stabilize prices. Speculators are smart, and they know when prices are too high or too low. They buy when prices are too low and sell when prices are too high, and in the process, they stabilize prices. "That is right!" said the professor; "What is your name?" I said my name, and I was proud, and I knew then and there that I would be an economist. But now I know that my answer was wrong. Facts I did not know then but do know now show that speculators stabilize prices at some times but destabilize them at others. I have changed my mind as the facts I know have changed.
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Much of finance has changed since the FAJ was founded in 1945, but the drive to uncover facts and make sense of them remains. Change of mind is an integral part of the process. As Keynes famously said, "When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?" Bogle, now 75, says he wrote the 1960 article under a pen name at the suggestion of Wellington's regulators and isn't embarrassed to acknowledge his authorship. The fund business in its early days did a better job of serving investors than now, he says" (p. C5). 2. For example, Markus Brunnermeier and Stefan Nagel (2004) found that hedge funds chose to ride the technology bubble of the late 1990s rather than counter it. They wrote, "Our findings question the efficient markets notion that rational speculators always stabilize prices. They are consistent with models in which rational investors may prefer to ride bubbles because of predictable investor sentiment and limits to arbitrage" (p. 2013).
